ONLY THE STATE, THROUGH ITS APPELLATE COUNSEL, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG),WHO HAS THE SOLE RIGHT AND AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SUPREME COURT.

The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 514).  The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.

Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, (ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 35 (1); Macasaet v. People, 492 Phil. 355, 375 (2005); Cariño v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688, 696; People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564, 575) who has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. (Cariño v. De Castro, supra note 24).

                As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus:

                 It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term “shall” x x x  

                  The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. (Gonzales v. Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816, 832; Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at 307).

For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule, (Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., supra note 20, at 334) summarily dismissed (Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at 306). (BURGOS vs. CA, G.R. No. 169711, February 08, 2010, ABAD, J.).

 

 

 

 

 

Advertisements

Leave a comment

Filed under Uncategorized

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s